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This paper explores the diversity of transnational Islam in Pakistan. 
The paper argues that most of Pakistan´s Islamic actors are tied to 
economic, cultural and religious forms of globalization. The radical and 
militant forms of transnational Islam in the country are largely driven by 
factors directly linked to Pakistan´s political and security apparatuses. 
It is suggested that the increase in militant activities in Pakistan stems 
from the reluctance or inability of Pakistan´s government to introduce 
firm standards of law and civility. The paper contends that networks 
centered on Islamic scholarship or Pakistan´s identity, are not per se 
violent and threatening, but reflect the religious, cultural and ethnic 
concerns of an expanding global diaspora of South Asian Muslims. 
Main Findings
Pakistan has become a hub of transnational Islam in the region with 
intence in- and outbound activity rooted in its culture, history and 
politics. Pakistan´s transnational Islamic actors largely emanate 
from competition between distinct religio-cultural milieus, the most 
important of which are the Deobandis, the Barelwis, Jama’at-i Islami, 
the Ahl-i Hadith, the Ahmadiyya and the Muhajirs. Transnational Islam 
can be distinguished by the different types of religio-political issues 
in pursues: 1) security and ideology, 2) religious mobilization, and 3) 
Pakistani nationalist identity. Mainly group one constitutes an abiding 
threat. The unstable, charged and polarized nature of overall political 
framework in Pakistan pushes many transnational actors into the 
political, extremist and even militant realm. Currently, the major threat 
the stability of Pakistan comes from sectarian and jihadi groups that 
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spin out of control from state and religious patronage. The doctrins and 
politics of sectarianism as expressed in the antagonism between various 
Islamic Pakistani groups in the struggle for the „true” Islam have heavily 
contributed to the radicalization of transnational Islamic actors in the 
country. Religio-cultural networks focussed on madrassas (Deobandis, 
Barelwis), missionary work (Tablighis, Da’wat-i Islami) or political 
mobilization (Jama’at-I Islami) have their own rationale of expansion and 
do not necessarily pose threats. 
Policy Implications
• Pakistan cannot successfully fight the Pakistani Taliban as long 
as some elements in the administration hope to keep intact 
this militant network for operation against India and the Karzai 
government. Neither can Pakistan achieve success as long as it 
does not address the tribal dimension of this warfare successfully 
since much of current Taliban operations reflect longstanding 
disaffected and marginalized tribal concerns. 
• The Pakistan state need to resurrect its civil authority and 
regulate civil institutions without discriminating against them. 
It will further have to focus on the social rehabilitation and 
development of disaffected communities giving rise to militant 
Islam, with education, employment and social amenities holding 
prime importance. 
• Pakistan and international agencies should be discouraged from 
punishing transnational actors of Islam for their efforts of religious 
mobilization as such behaviour appears to be counterproductive. 
• While some political analysts believe that the madrassa system 
is one major source of instability religious education will always 
have to remain religious in its nature. Educational standards can 
only be improved by lifting Pakistani public education in a major 
way. 
Recent news about the abiding tension and violence in the conflicts 
Afghanistan and Kashmir on the borders with Pakistan has again drawn 
international attention to transnational actors of Islam operating from 
Pakistan’s territory. But can these transnational actors be uniformly 
considered a threat and is their virulence and violence related to their 
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religious affiliation? Is all transnational Islam dangerous and why is so 
much of its activity associated with Pakistan?
Today it is an established fact that Pakistan has become a major 
international locus and hub of transnational Islamic networks and in-
stitutions. These networks and institutions have exercised various de-
grees of influence on the political and security situation in and around 
Pakistan. Their impact has grown continuously, particularly since the 
1980s. Although most of these forces and networks are now well known 
through international media coverage and the academic literature, for 
many observers of international politics – and also of international Is-
lam – the prominence of transnational Islam in Pakistan may still seem 
paradoxical considering its remote location and the often culturalist con-
notation of its body politics. To understand why Pakistan, coming from 
a rather particularist background in terms of its geography, politics and 
culture, plays such a prominent role in a universalist issue such as to-
day’s transnational Islam, this paper intends to discuss:
• the historical background of this development, with a special 
emphasis on structural factors installing transnational activism in 
Pakistan’s modern social and political system;
• the structure of this activism with regard to the nature and 
direction of the religio-political issues involved; and
• the main types of transnational actors and institutions in 
Pakistan and their relations to the issues driving them.
This explanation will be prefaced by a brief discussion of the nexus 
between transnationalism and Islam and an introduction of transnational 
actors of Islam in Pakistan.
Transnationalism and Islam
In general, and even more so in relation to Pakistan, the nature of the 
transnational activism of Islamic actors and institutions needs to be seen 
in a rather nuanced light. This analysis here is based on the assumption 
that religious practice and knowledge alone are hardly responsible 
for transnational activism in the sense of crossing national borders in 
and out of Pakistan. If looked at closely, such transnational activity 
constitutes only a part of their activism;1 and is more often than not 
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driven by sociological, political, ideological, ethnic and cultural concerns 
that are equally shared with non-Islamic actors and institutions.2
Transnational Actors and Institutions of Islam
The major players in this field are networks of religious scholars and 
schools with their religious and political groups and parties creating 
separate traditions or milieus within Pakistani (and South Asian) Islam 
that go back to centers and activists in north India before independence. 
These milieus have acquired partly hereditary endogamous features of 
sects or clans with a large and continuously growing number of subsidiary 
outlets (see Appendix I). Their missionary efforts are directed as much 
at non-Muslims as at each other in the struggle for a larger share and 
control of the “Islamic field.”
Deobandi. The Deobandi scholars and schools refer to the purist and 
reformist interpretation of Sunni Islam of the Hanafi law school formu-
lated at the Darul Ulum of Deoband in north India, which was founded in 
1867. It has now spread through an estimated 2000 schools in Pakistan, 
India and Bangladesh each. The Deobandi cultural style has been fru-
gal and text-based, fighting against “impermissible innovations” (bida‘) 
and for the “true Islam.” This leads the Deobandis to polemical attacks 
at most other traditions of Islam, but also against non-Muslims. Their 
political approach is split between oppositional polemics and a pietist 
yearning for learning. The Deobandi political party, the Jami‘yat-e Ula-
ma-e Islam (JUI, Party of Scholars of Islam, founded in 1944), is the 
largest component of the Muttahida Majlis-e Amal (MMA), an alliance of 
Pakistani religious parties founded in 2001. The JUI attracted interna-
tional attention for its close relations with the Afghan Taliban, sharing 
with them a reliance on Deobandi doctrine (Reetz 2007; Metcalf 1982).
Barelwi. These groups relate to the devotional tradition of Sufi-related 
Sunni scholars and schools that centered on the activities of Ahmad 
Raza Khan Barelwi (1856-1921) in the town of Bareilly in north India. 
The Barelwis have probably expanded within similar parameters as the 
Deobandis. The Barelwis’ main raison d’être was the defense of spiritual 
rituals against the reformist critique of the Deobandis and others. 
Doctrine-wise, their differences are small as both follow orthodox 
adherence (taqlid) to the Hanafi law school. But the Barelwis emphasize 
Sufi traditions such as special praise for the Prophet, and the worship 
FORUM: TRANSNATIONAL ISLAM IN PAKISTAN
175
of saints and their shrines, all of which they justify with reference to 
the Quran and the Prophetic traditions, the Hadith. Their cultural style 
has been exuberant, and their politics were often marked by loyalty 
to the powers that be during the colonial period and, afterwards, 
the independent secular state. In the political arena the Barelwis are 
represented by the Jami‘yat-e Ulama-e Pakistan (JUP, Party of Religious 
Scholars of Pakistan, founded in 1948) (Sanyal 1996).
Jama‘at-i Islami. The rather modernist Jama‘at-i Islami (JI, Islamic 
Party) network centers on the JI political party created in British India 
in 1941 and the legacy of its founder Abu’l A‘la Maududi (1903-79). 
The JI is an important political player in Pakistan and Bangladesh, while 
remaining a cultural and religious organization in India. Their cultural 
style is modern and technical, while their political approach is issue-
based and power-oriented. The JI’s objective is to establish political 
and cultural hegemony, to form the government and rule the country 
in much the same way as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) did in India, 
which has greatly inspired them.
Ahl-i Hadith. The Ahl-i Hadith (AH, People of the Tradition) scholars 
and schools represent a minority purist Sunni sect rejecting all Islamic 
law schools but privileging the Prophetic traditions (Hadith). The AH 
formed in the north Indian provinces of Punjab and United Provinces 
at the turn of the 20th century. The AH is known for its strong orien-
tation towards Saudi Arabia and affiliation with Salafi networks. The 
AH party (Markazi Ahl-i Hadith) consists of several factions. The AH 
network is polarized between a scholarly and a more radical, militant 
wing (Riexinger 2004).
Shia. The Shia scholars and groups of Pakistan form an important 
contestant of the Islamic field representing around 15% of all Muslims. 
Their influence on Pakistan’s politics and culture can be traced back to 
their longstanding share in Muslim culture and politics in the subconti-
nent, partly through the Shia-dominated principalities and landholders 
in the late colonial period. The formation of the Tahrik-e Jafariyya-e 
Pakistan (TJP, Movement for the Introduction of the Shia Legal Code 
in the Tradition of Imam Jafar) in 1979 marked a turning point in Shia 
mobilization in Pakistan as Shia activists felt strongly encouraged by 
the Iranian revolution. Many Shia organizations are still closely connect-
ed with Iranian institutions, but also with Shia groups in neighboring 
countries such as Afghanistan and India, as with migrant communities 
abroad. Their political agenda is shaped by their desire to secure safe 
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minority rights, to uphold traditional influence and to resist doctrinal 
pressures from the Sunni majority with defiance (Monsutti, Naef and 
Sabahi 2007).
Ahmadiyya. The minority sect of the Ahmadiyya founded by Ghulam 
Ahmad Mirza (1839-1908) also emerged in Punjab province in the late 
colonial period. Most mainstream Muslim groups regard the Ahmadi-
yya as heretic. It is particularly the claims of the Ahmadiyya’s founder, 
and his successors to some degree, of Prophethood that have enraged 
radical Sunni Muslim activists. A constitutional amendment declared the 
Ahmadis non-Muslims in 1974. The Ahmadis sometimes face violent 
repression in Pakistan, but have proven enormously resilient, particu-
larly relying on their strong global missionary activities. For Ahmadis, 
calling themselves Muslim was made a criminal offence under Zia’s Is-
lamist dictatorship through amendments of the Penal Code in 1982-86 
(Pakistan Penal Code 1982). In spite of strong political and religious 
pressures, they still manage to uphold a traditional presence among the 
middle classes and in the administration, including the security forces 
(Valentine 2008; Reetz 2006).
Muhajirs. The Muhajirs (migrants) form yet another religio-cultural 
milieu irrespective of their strong heterogeneity. They descended from 
migrants from India’s Muslim minority provinces – mainly from Delhi, 
Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh – speaking Urdu as their mother tongue 
– unlike the local population in today’s Pakistan. Today, the Muha-
jirs exercise their religious and political influence largely through the 
political party of the Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM, National Migrant 
Front, founded in 1984), its numerous wings and institutions. The 
Muhajir population share is about 8% (WWWa); the MQM currently 
holds 25 seats in parliament (WWWb). MQM’s ideology is outwardly 
based on secularist notions of “practicality” though still marked by a 
religious background ranging from modernism to spiritual, local Is-
lam. The MQM opposes the politicized Islam of the JI and the Deo-
bandis. They are based primarily in urban Sindh – mainly Karachi and 
Haiderabad. Many leading representatives of the Pakistani adminis-
tration and the security establishment have a Muhajir background, 
including the former presidents and military dictators, the generals 
Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf. The MQM is the third-largest party 
in Pakistan, switching allegiances between the two major parties, the 
Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League wing led 
by Nawaz Sharif (PML-N) (Verkaaik 2004).
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These religious traditions and networks expanded into separate reli-
gio-cultural milieus with a large number of derivative organizations and 
institutions. For the propagation of their interpretation of Islam, they 
created NGO-type institutions devoted to religious education and mis-
sionary activities. The most widely known subsidiary Deobandi network 
is the pietist missionary movement of the Tablighi Jama‘at that was 
founded near Delhi in 1926 but has since spread around the globe. In 
the political field, we find parties run by religious scholars (ulama) of all 
persuasions. The JI and the MQM are political parties in their own right. 
Several spawned or hosted youth, student and women’s groups, while 
some affiliated sectarian and militant outfits, so called jihadi groups, 
originally serving as party militias.
Historical Background
The impact of transnational Islam on Pakistan can hardly be understood 
without considering major historical factors in its evolution that were 
already transnational in their own way. Against this background, it 
is probably not surprising that transnational Islam has come to play 
such a prominent role with regard to Pakistan. We are faced here with 
the evolution of a country that emerged from a multinational colonial 
empire, and went through two painful partitions of statehood – first, 
of British India in 1947 and, second, of the larger Pakistan state in 
1971. And we are looking at Pakistan as the inheritor of traditions of 
South Asian Islam that had politically ruled for more than 600 years 
over vast territories of the subcontinent despite the minority status of 
Islam, cutting across various state formations through history and the 
geographic expanses of the South Asian lands.
The culture, religion and politics of Pakistan had crossed national and 
state borders as a matter of inherent being. Pakistan’s ideological na-
ture—venturing to provide a home to Muslims in South Asia – aspired to 
a symbolic negation of state boundaries. Yet the political and ideological 
forces ruling the country resurrected nationalist concerns by marrying 
the two seemingly irreconcilable elements of an in- and outside orienta-
tion in the doctrine of the so-called Pakistan ideology, which was ori-
ented towards the nation-state and also pointing beyond it at the same 
time. This ideology was based on the concept of Muslim nationalism that 
assumed Muslims in British India, as a religious community, were legally 
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entitled to a nation-state of their own (Cf. Reetz 2006: 35f.). This his-
torical process created structural elements that installed cross-border 
interaction in the body politics of Pakistan on a permanent basis. To 
understand these dynamics it is proposed here to consider the role of: 
1) migrants; 2) partition of the subcontinent; and 3) the subcontinent’s 
cultural fragmentation.
Looking at it from today’s perspective, migrants played a key role 
in the transmission of South Asian cultural, religious and political influ-
ences. The near-global, multi-national and multi-cultural nature of the 
British colonial empire was a major factor in this. Migrants from the 
subcontinent created a backbone for the expansion of cultural, ethnic 
and religious networks from South Asia, first across the British Empire 
and, later, much beyond, wherever new migrants went. The British Em-
pire – and colonial rule in general – represented its own form of forced 
historical globalization. Labor migration from South Asia across the Em-
pire was popular and common, but so was migration for commercial, 
political or social reasons.
While previously it was said that the sun would never set over the 
territories of the British Empire, today this saying has been rephrased 
by Indian politicians in charge of overseas Indians to the sun never 
sets down on the Indian diaspora (Singhvi 2002) which, by extension, 
would also apply to Pakistani and other South Asian diasporas. This in-
fluence can be traced back further to trading castes from areas such as 
Gujarat which had prefigured such transnational flows by their outward 
expansion well before the British ruled over the subcontinent. South 
Asian traders went to Southeast Asia, to East and South Africa, and 
also to Europe.
The emergence of Pakistan through the partition of the subcontinent 
in the name of Islam introduced another structural element generating 
transnational activism. As the ideological and political headquarters of 
most Islamic actors had been located in north India, they were forced 
through partition to relocate to what is today Pakistan and Bangladesh. 
In this process they had to adapt to geopolitical change, and to replicate 
and multiply their activities in a transnational and transcultural context. 
For many of them, such as the Deobandis, Tablighis and Barelwis, this 
valuable experience constituted a blueprint for further expansion at a 
later stage. It also imbued them with an ideological mission that in 
many ways drove them beyond the geographical and political confines 
of their regions and countries of origin. As the process of partition radi-
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calized political, religious and ethnic actors, religious and ethnic militias 
were further strengthened, creating an awareness and experience of 
militia violence as being a suitable or potentially successful tool to com-
pete and fight for cultural and political influence and supremacy.
The cultural and religious fragmentation of the subcontinent had, 
early on, introduced a high degree of competition and infighting not 
only between various traditions and cultural norms, but also within such 
formations. Thus, Muslim groups and publics multiplied since the mid-
19th century, vying with each other for domination among Muslims and 
further competing with other religious, cultural and secular groups. The 
combination of Islamic mobilization with the cultural pluralism of colo-
nial India and the specific ways of introducing political modernity during 
the colonial era led to competitive cultural mobilization that took a leaf 
out of caste- and clan-based politics. This competitive mobilization fully 
extended to the Islamic field and expanded beyond geographical bor-
ders on the back of migratory and trading flows as well as universalist 
ambitions.
Issues and Directions of Transnational Islam in Pakistan
As the factors responsible for the evolution of Pakistan’s transnational 
Islamic activism already suggest, its structure is very heterogeneous. 
To make sense of this structure it is suggested here to distinguish 
between different types of religio-political issues and the direction 
of transnational activities. Such differentiation owes much to the 
historical influences discussed before. The rise and growing impact of 
transnational Islam in Pakistan can be traced back to issues rooted in 
the historical antecedents of Pakistan’s statehood as it emerged from 
the partition of the South Asian subcontinent as a “homeland for Indian 
Muslims.” Consequently, it also took different directions, vacillating 
between regional and global orientation.
In many ways this transnationalism was prefigured by the role and 
structure of Indian Islamic activism before independence as represented 
by the madrassa networks of competing Islamic schools and interpreta-
tions of the Deobandi, Barelwi, Ahl-i Hadith, or Ahmadi variety. While most 
of this mobilization proceeded on a pietist and self-consciously religious 
trajectory, part of it was pushed in a decidedly political direction by the im-
pact of Pakistan’s military and bureaucratic establishment. Consequently, 
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it is suggested here to discuss transnational Islam in Pakistan from three 
different angles relating to the nature of the religio-political activism:
Security- and ideology-related issues. These are issues that Paki-
stan’s military and intelligence establishment – for a significant period 
as an international ally of the United States and other Western countries 
– was involved and/or constituted the driving force behind their preva-
lence. These issues would include the regional conflicts in Afghanistan 
and Kashmir, but also pan-Islamist ambitions and activities towards oth-
er neighboring countries and regions, such as India and Iran, post-Soviet 
Central Asia and China’s Xinjiang province. Actors within this category 
mainly date from the late 1970s and would include radical Islamic mili-
tants, with sectarian outfits forming an important sub-grouping, as well 
as radical madrassas and charities established under political tutelage 
during the Afghan civil war and its aftermath.
Religious Islamic activism. Islamic activism primarily originated in 
late colonial India. It extended into Pakistan and expanded from South 
Asia on the back of South Asian migrants and trading communities 
across the world. This group would include faith-based religious and pi-
etist networks such as the Deobandi, Tablighi, Barelwi, Jama‘at-i Islami, 
Ahl-i Hadith and Ahmadi varieties.
Pakistan-specific activism. Nationalist and localized activism pursued 
by Islamist institutions and globalizing networks are primarily rooted in 
or increasingly driven by Pakistan’s social and political life. This category 
encompasses a diversity of group actors and networks that self con-
sciously operate from or through the nation-state of Pakistan as their 
home base. Some of them are clear representatives of political Islamism. 
They would include the Jama‘at-i Islami and the (Mirpuri) Kashmir sup-
port groups. Others are educational, pietist or devotional networks, 
examples of which would be the International Islamic Universities, the 
modern educational Barelwi network of the Minhaj-ul-Quran, the Barelwi 
missionary movement of the Da‘wat-i Islami, Sufi scholars and their dis-
ciples. They combine their pan-Islamic or universalist ambitions with a 
clear association to Pakistani nationalist, and sometimes, local identity.
If we assume that transnationalism can be perceived on different 
trajectories and dimensions, we would base this classification on the un-
derstanding that these variations are united by the fact of crossing the 
border of the nation-state as a regular part of their activism or existence. 
Different Islamic actors, institutions and concepts—elements of the pub-
lic sphere, of a multiple process of public mobilization in the name of 
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Islam - have imbibed this transnationalism in various ways. In a larger 
sense, every selfconscious Islamic actor is transnational pointing to the 
larger Muslim community - or Ummah - as the frame of reference. It is 
proposed here to differentiate those actors also according to the more 
dominant element and character of their transnational orientation:
 
1. A transnational global orientation is constitutive for the  
 movement. This would apply to the Tablighi Jama‘at as it 
regards itself pursuing a global religious mission. To a lesser 
extent also other faith-based, pietist movements such as the 
religious traditions of the Deobandis, Barelwis, Ahl-i Hadith, 
Shia or Ahmadiyya do not relate themselves to state boundaries 
or nationalities but develop a global perspective. 
2. A transnational regional orientation is constitutive for the 
movement. This applies to most jihadi outfits driven by the 
regional conflicts of Kashmir, Afghanistan, and to a lesser extent 
Central Asia.
3. Transnational (religious) orientation is derivative of connections 
with Muslim migrant communities. This can be observed on the 
Kashmiri (Mirpuri) migrant groups operating in Britain, North 
America and mainland Europe. It is also a striking feature of the 
networks related to the Barelwi tradition such as the Minhaj-ul-
Quran or the missionary movement of the Da‘wat-i Islami.
4. A transnational political and ideological outlook is constitutive for 
them, of which their transnational activism is derivative. Groups 
such as the Jama‘at-i Islami, but also the Ahl-i Hadith strongly 
follow their ideological agenda when they cross Pakistan’s 
borders, even though their migrant affiliations will also play out. 
But their ideological slant allows them to transcend the limitations 
of their origins and attract followers of other ethnic and national 
background—for example, the Jama‘at-i Islami to their brand of 




In order to establish the (political) virulence of transnational Islam in 
Pakistan, Islamic networks have to be seen and understood as multi-
faceted social, cultural and political networks, which may show a major 
thrust in one direction while still being driven in other directions. There 
is a strong belief that transnational Islamic activism from Pakistan’s 
soil may never have reached the political and security dimensions it 
has acquired today without the intervention of Pakistan’s military and 
bureaucratic establishment. The basis of intervention was a certain 
confluence – but certainly no identity – in the ideological orientation 
of these political and religious actors towards Islamist universalism. 
Pakistan’s military and bureaucratic establishment derived its political 
legitimacy from the so-called Pakistan ideology and its related “Muslim 
nationalism” which was a variant of pan-Islamic mobilization.
It was particularly General Zia-ul-Haq who, with the express con-
sent and encouragement of Western nations, and the U.S. in particular, 
politicized Islam to stabilize his own hold on power. During his reign 
several Islamic actors allowed themselves to be instrumentalized hop-
ing to advance their own ideological objectives. This state intervention 
grossly “distorted” the Islamic field and created new players, institu-
tions and concepts which later on acquired an identity and life of their 
own. Most of the time, in the past as well as right into the present, 
transnational militant Islamist activity in Afghanistan and Kashmir has 
been under the control, on the leash or at least partly related to ele-
ments of Pakistan’s military and security-related bureaucracy. In turn, 
the current “threat” or political virulence of transnational Islam as seen 
from the West can hardly be separated from the conflicts in Afghanistan 
and Kashmir. Major champions of these issues are transnational jihadi 
groups such as the Lashkar-i Taiba (LT, Pious Army, 1988, Ahl-i Hadith), 
Jaish-e Muhammadi (JM, Muhammad’s Army, 2000, Deobandi), or the 
Hizbul-Mujahidin (HM, Party of Holy Warriors, 1989, Jama‘at-i Islami), 
mainly operating in Indian Kashmir.
Separate mention has to be made of the issue of sectarianism. As 
discussed above, competitive Islamic mobilization has led religious 
groups to fight for the correct and true Islam. Given the cultural frag-
mentation of South Asian Muslims, these doctrinal differences turned 
into sectarian conflicts. Prominent Pakistani sectarian groups include the 
Sipah-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan (SSP, Pakistan’s Army of the Companions of 
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the Prophet, 1985, Deobandi), the split-away faction of the Lashkar-i 
Jhangwi (LJ, Jhangwi’s Army, 1994, Deobandi), the Sunni Tahrik (ST, 
Sunni Movement, 1990, Barelwi), and the Sipah-i-Mohammadi (SM, 
Muhammad’s Army, 1993, Shia).
While the concepts underlying doctrinal differences are being pro-
moted by the madrassa networks, it is through the formation of radi-
cal militias which have enjoyed the backing of the military and secu-
rity apparatus that these differences turned into operational ideologies 
and politics. They were played out in violence between Sunni and Shia 
groups; battles for mosque control between Deobandis and Barelwis; 
clashes pitting Muhajir groups against local competitors in urban Sindh; 
attacks targeting Ahmadis, but also Ahl-i Hadith activists. Radical 
groups seeking to defend the “Finality of Prophethood” in Islam (Khatm-
e Nabuwwat) against Ahmadi doctrinal claims are associated with acts 
of violence; they have also established a global presence. Being a major 
driving force behind the formation of jihadi groups and the expansion of 
their activism to Pakistan’s neighboring states and territories, sectarian 
beliefs have fuelled jihadi militancy more than is commonly acknowl-
edged. As such, sectarianism is a major factor in the continuing high 
levels of militancy on the Pakistan-Afghan border, as well as in Kashmir. 
There are numerous examples where sectarian groups got logisti-
cal support from the jihadi outfits of their networks. For instance, the 
SSP trained in camps of the Harkat-ul-Mujahidin in Afghanistan (while 
still under Taliban rule) and Pakistani Kashmir. The Shia militia Pasban 
trained in camps of the Shia jihadi group for Kashmir, Hizbul Momi-
neen (Rana 2004). Their leadership structures and funding networks 
also overlap. Many jihadi groups are ideologically driven by the same 
quest for the “true” interpretation of Islam, a concept they share with 
the sectarian outfits of their milieu. According to Amir Rana, many of 
the sectarian groups rely on support from the business community 
which is also divided by ethnic and religious cleavages. They interact 
with the sectarian and radical milieu in order to promote their own 
business activities, to harm competitors, or to conduct personal ven-
dettas. These business networks which evolved out of the South Asia 
Muslim trading castes sometimes also patronize the transnational ac-
tivities of radical groups.
The backing of the military and intelligence services, combined 
with concomitant cash flows, created a market of religious violence 
in which groups split and degenerated into rogue militias which pursued 
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religious objectives in name only, but were more interested in collecting 
money and handing out cars and perks to their members. Sociologically, 
they were more akin to urban banditry. While the ideologically motivated 
groups had sometimes listened to religious scholars serving as their pa-
trons, the rogue militias had stopped doing so. This made it even more 
difficult for Pakistan to control them. Splinter factions of the Harkat-ul-
Jihad-i-Islami and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi were at times considered rogue 
groups spinning out of any command. Some of the lesser known groups 
which had claimed responsibility for acts of violence could be counted 
here. The Al-Faran may have been such a group, claiming responsibility 
for the abduction of six western tourists in Indian Kashmir and killing 
one of them in 1995 (Cf. Hanzarika 1995; Burns 1995). Some factions of 
the MQM, the Urdu-speaking migrant movement in Sindh, which in 1992 
split with active help of the military hoping to control them, could also be 
considered rogue elements.
Most of the transnational mujahidin groups developed a regional fo-
cus as they had been formed to intervene in the conflicts of Kashmir, Af-
ghanistan and sometimes also targeted post-Soviet and Chinese Central 
Asia. In a competition of its own, groups solely focusing on Kashmir have 
been linked to all of the major religious parties of Sunni and Shia Is-
lam in Pakistan (Deobandi, Barelwi, Ahl-i Hadith, Jama‘at-i Islami, TJP). 
Analysts believe that most of them have also received support from the 
military and intelligence establishment in Pakistan, which over a long 
period played a prominent role in coordination, funding, training and 
logistical support. While much of their activism was outbound, Pakistan 
had to face some inbound activities as a consequence of their interven-
tion (such as the influx of ex-Taliban and other foreign fighters, but also 
of Indian Muslims recruited for the Kashmir conflict).
From among the jihadi groups operating in Pakistan, it is probably 
correct to assume that it is mainly “inbound” transnational actors that 
pursue a distinct global orientation. Al Qaeda constitutes the most prom-
inent example as it linked up with radicalized sectarian Sunni groups of 
various denominations (Deobandi, Ahl-i Hadith, Barelwi). Uzbek, Chech-
en and Uighur fighters would constitute another group of foreign fighters 
stranded with their families in the northwestern tribal regions of Paki-
stan as a residue of the Afghan conflict. Fleeing from their local conflicts 
in Uzbekistan, Chechnya and the Xinjiang province of China, they had 
joined the Afghan war as “comrades-in-arms” of the Taliban.
The more peaceful and ideological global Islamic networks such as 
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Hizb ut-Tahrir and Al-Muhajirun, would also fall in this category. Local 
Pakistani enthusiasts with an intellectual background ventured to estab-
lish national units, which failed to take off on a larger scale. It is their 
Arabo-centric culture which makes it difficult for these networks to strike 
deep roots in the Islamist milieu of Pakistan that is largely driven by 
Urdu- and local language tradition (Rana 2004).
Regarding outside actors of transnational Islam in Pakistan, the in-
ternational media and policymakers often point to foreign students at-
tending the traditional madrassas, but also the modernist International 
Islamic University. After 9/11, their number has significantly gone down, 
partly for lack of funding due to international political pressure, partly 
because of specific bans and restrictions introduced by the government 
of Pakistan, also under international pressure. In terms of motivation, 
those international students would consist of two groups: one which 
traditionally has sought guidance from religious scholars of other coun-
tries, and another, following the trajectories of political and ideological 
issues that have been fought in the name of Islam since the 1980s in 
the region.
Political Madrassas and Charities
Newly formed radical madrassas and charities run by militant outfits have 
emerged as a separate group owing their existence to Pakistan’s political 
and ideological polarization. Some of these groups established regular 
religious schools across Pakistan providing religious instruction – loosely 
based on the famous theological curriculum of the Dars-e Nizami followed 
by most Sunni mainstream madrassas. In addition, they would teach the 
ideology of their own militant group, including their special reading of the 
jihad concept. These include the schools of the Jama‘at al- Da‘wat (JD, 
Missionary Party) following the Ahl-i Hadith doctrine. The JD emerged 
in 2002 out of the former missionary center Markaz-ul-Da‘wa-tul-Irshad 
(1986) and allowed the Lashkar-e Taiba fighters to regroup within its 
ranks when they were banned. According to various estimates, the JD 
runs 50 to 100 schools all over Pakistan with up to 10,000 students, 
many of which are known as Jamia-ud-Da‘wa-tul-Islamiyya (Ibid.: 325f.).
But also the Jaish-e Mohammadi, now under the name of Al Fur-
kan, and the Sipah-e Sahaba are believed to run their own madrassas. 
According to Muhammad Rana, six militant outfits are now working 
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as charities. Jaish-e Muhammad is now working by the name of Al-
Rehmat Trust, Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami as Al-Ershad Trust and Harkatul 
Mujahideen as Al-A(n)sar Trust on Pakistan territory, although they 
continue their operations under their old names in Pakistani and Indian 
Kashmir (Rana 2006).
One also has to consider those perhaps 50 to 100 madrassas, 
mainly of Deobandi persuasion, that had been selected in the early 
1980s by Pakistan, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia to facilitate the conduit 
of military training and arms for the Afghan war (Raman 2001).3 Some 
of them were built anew, others were long established. The latter 
ones, with a clear radical reputation, include the so-called Binuri Town 
Madrassa in Karachi from where many Taliban leaders graduated, and 
the Madrassa Haqaniyya in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) 
in Akora Khattak, run by the Deobandi splinter party, the JUI (S), led 
by Samiul Haq (Rana 2004).
The Lal Masjid or Red Mosque in Islamabad, which gained notoriety 
through the stand-off with the Pakistani security forces in early 2007, 
is a prominent example of the mosques and madrassas newly created 
by the military and security establishment for the jihad against the 
Soviet Union. The two religious schools attached to it were attended 
by up to 10,000 students. Lal Masjid’s founder, Maulana Muhammad 
Abdullah, was an outspoken cleric supporting the U.S.-sponsored war 
against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. His two sons, Abdul Aziz and 
Abdul Rashid Ghazi, spearheaded the recent confrontation (WWWc). 
The clerics and students of these mosques and madrassas across Paki-
stan still breathe resentment over the “betrayal,” or the reversal of the 
military leadership under General Musharraf to back the U.S. and other 
Western nations in the war against terror.
 
Faith-Based Religious and Pietist Networks
The rationale for most transnational religious activism emerging from 
Pakistan remains faithbased and piety-driven. Such activism aims at 
the transfer of religious knowledge, the perfecting and strengthening 
of religious observance, increasing the number of followers in a tough 
competition with other Islamic groups and recruiting new adherents 
from among non-Muslims. These objectives can be clearly observed 
in the network of Deobandi madrassas. The vast network of Deobandi 
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madrassas in the subcontinent and beyond continues to expand on 
its own rational grounds related to its expansion as a socio-cultural 
and educational movement, which cannot be sufficiently explained by 
security, military, or even political arguments. Reasons for Deobandi 
activism are more related to competitive mobilization that started during 
the late colonial era. The religious Islamic networks established in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century have gone transnational 
and global through the lens of their own missionary ideology bent on 
expanding the influence of their groups (Reetz 2005, 2008). The pattern 
they follow is time-worn: students go to new places where they establish 
a school of their own. This can be a pious endeavor or the attempt to 
become self-employed. In the process, students go abroad to service 
the foreign communities of Deobandi descent by offering them an 
educational outlet. Another driving force seems to be the doctrinal and 
ideological competition with rival groups in foreign Muslim communities 
(of South Asian descent) where they particularly seek to confront the 
Barelwis, Ahl-I Hadith, and to counter the perceived influence of the 
Ahmadis. 
Pakistan’s madrassas are estimated to include up to 20,000 schools 
which can be of a varying degree of sophistication. If we take those 
considered somewhat equivalent to a secondary education, they would 
teach a formal eight-year degree course awarding the title of a religious 
scholar (‘alim). Their number would probably be less than 10,000 in the 
whole of Pakistan. Enrolment figures have become a matter of political 
debate. Accordingly, their estimates vary grossly. A recent study com-
paring various statistical data asserted that the size of the madrassa 
sector is much overrated. The authors consider schools teaching a reli-
gious curriculum and demanding full daytime attendance, and not sec-
ondary attendance after or before public school classes:
According to our analysis, the madrassa sector is small compared to 
educational options such as public and private schooling, accounting 
for less than 1 percent of overall enrolment in the country. Even in 
the districts that border Afghanistan, where madrassa enrolment is 
the highest in the country, it is less than 7.5 percent of all enrolled 
children. Furthermore, we find no evidence of a dramatic increase 
in madrassa enrolment in recent years (Andrabi, Das, Khwaja and 
Zajonc 2006: 446-477). 
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What is important for this paper is that the authors of that study, 
which was based on detailed household sample interviews, found 
no particular evidence to suggest that madrassa attendance in a 
household depends on religious or social variables. Differences with 
regard to the literacy level of the head of the household or its income 
situation between “madrassa” and “non-madrassa households,” where 
a child is enrolled or not, were marginal. They were below 10%. “The 
largest difference between household types is their proximity to a 
private school.” (Ibid.: 461). The findings confirm that madrassa 
attendance is a matter of practical consideration with regard to 
education opportunities. The study also confirms the anthropological 
observation that madrassa attendance is driven by the wish and long-
standing tradition in South Asian Muslim households to devote one 
child to a religious career which is expected to bring rewards for the 
whole family in the hereafter.
The madrassa networks from Pakistan (and South Asia) have now 
firmly established themselves on a global scale. Deobandi networks 
and institutions vie for influence not only with Barelwi networks from 
South Asia, but, for example, with Salafi institutions and networks, 
forming another distinct, even though highly amorphous and hetero-
geneous “rival” network. Modern Islamic schools combining religious 
and secular teaching form another type of transnational alliances, ex-
changing teachers, students and concepts; so do the International Is-
lamic Universities. Sufi networks modernize themselves establishing 
“franchises” in various countries and regions.
Arguably the most successful transnational pietist network from 
South Asia, the Tablighi Jama‘at, is now considered the largest living 
transnational movement of Islam on the globe. The TJ is believed to 
have attracted 12-15 million followers worldwide, thus transcending 
the sociocultural boundaries of South Asian migrants. In France and 
Spain, the TJ largely relies on Muslim migrants from North Africa; in 
Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and South East Asia, local Muslims 
constitute the majority of followers where South Asia descent only 
plays a minimal role. While the movement expanded exponentially 
and joined the Muslim mainstream, its leaders kept away from poli-
tics. Yet the majority of lay followers brought into the movement new 
social, economic and political concerns. Its emphasis on ritual and 
observance has changed the political micro-climate in many regions 
in favor of Islamist political actors. Some militant groups have also 
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tried to exploit the prestige and influence of the TJ as well as ideological 
affinity through a wider interpretation of the jihad concept as a struggle 
for the correct religious behaviour.
While the TJ no doubt has a global concept of expansion, it would 
be far-fetched to assume that it organizes militant or political Is-
lamism. In fact, it has long been attacked by political Islamists such 
as the Jama‘at-i Islami for neglecting political struggle. Recently, it 
has tried to limit the transfer of Western recruits to local madrassas in 
South Asia. Such a transfer was heavily criticized by Western analysts 
as it allegedly created a conduit to militant groups, a highly specula-
tive and largely unproven assumption as most convicted international 
terrorists had a modern educational background. 
Religious networks from the Sufi-related Barelwi milieu have tried 
to catch up with Deobandi transnationalism, although as a rule they 
rarely manage to go beyond the South Asian Muslim diaspora. The 
modernist Sufi network of the Deedat Islamic centers is a notable 
exception as it managed to operate successfully in South Africa, Ara-
bic and Western countries (Westerlund 2003: 263ff.). Their emphasis 
is on comparative religious propagation highlighting the superiority 
of the Quran as compared to the Bible. Their pamphlets teach “cor-
rect” Islamic practice (prayer, dress, fasting, and education) in a mod-
ern setting. But the family network behind the organization based in 
South Africa (Durban) is related to the Barelwi section of the South 
Asian diaspora.
This diaspora background often emerged from links with specific 
South Asian trading casts that extended across the former British 
colonial empire and beyond. The religious networks of the Deobandis 
and Barelwis are the most prominent cases in point. Many of those 
networks rely on Gujarati or Memon trading caste connections. As 
mentioned, the Barelwis are less likely than the Deobandis to cross 
the social boundaries of South Asian/Pakistani migrant communities. 
This may be related to the much stronger hereditary element in tra-
ditional Barelwi culture. The madrassas at Deoband and the shrine 
of the Barelwi founder Ahmad Raza in Bareilly (India) act as norma-
tive centers for their global activities, with little strategy and policy 
in terms of expansion or control. Even though their global expansion 
is partly driven by competition, it is rarely planned and executed in a 
centralized manner. These groups developed several subsidiary net-
works. For the Deobandis, these would comprise Deobandi madras-
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sas, sometimes affiliated with Deobandi shaykhs and their disciples, 
but also political groups (Jamiat-e Ulama in South Africa, Canada).
The Ahmadi network is driven by both religious and migration con-
cerns. A transnational orientation has become constitutive for the Ah-
madiyya, as the group has been persecuted in Pakistan where it had 
relocated its religious center after independence. The Ahmadis are cur-
rently running their British center as a global headquarters. They have 
also been able to transcend their South Asian background, notably in 
Africa and Southeast Asia, although their connection to Pakistan’s cul-
ture remains strong and important.
We should also consider here the religious groups drawing doctrinal 
inspiration from centers of normative Islam in the larger West Asian 
region, but outside Pakistan’s borders. This orientation would apply to 
Shia groups and their solidarity with Iran’s religious and political lead-
ership. Their bonds, however, would be highly heterogeneous. In their 
outbound activity, these actors would be driven by local concerns and 
the search for religious guidance from Iranian theologians. Inbound 
activity could be driven by both the religious and political establish-
ment in Iran which does not necessarily follow the same trajectories. 
In- and outbound activities will also be found with South Asian Shia 
migrant networks that not necessarily dissolve in global Shia migra-
tion. Shia groups in their transnational attachment thus roughly divide 
into two camps – one loyalist to the state of Pakistan with a moderate 
agenda, and the other ideological with strong devotion to Iran and its 
religious leaders.
The Ahl-i Hadith subscribes in its own ways to the ideas of global 
Islamic activism for both political and religio-ideological goals. The Ahl-i 
Hadith transnational ideology is largely focused on Saudi Arabia with 
which it identifies because of its doctrinal and ideological affinity with 
Hanbalism and Wahhabism. If taken literally, though, this identification 
would reveal a paradoxical constellation as the Ahl-i Hadith rejects the 
Sunni law schools whereas Wahhabism derives from observance of the 
Hanbalite legal tradition. They are united in their “equal” reverence for 
the founders of these law schools and their rejection of impermissible or 
“un-Islamic” innovations (bida‘).
Their ideology has been labeled – both by them and others – as 
Salafi, or following the pious founder generation of Islam (as-Salaf). Yet 
the term Salafi is loose enough to unite highly heterogeneous elements 
under its umbrella, with a pietist, political and militant faction. The tar-
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get of Ahl-i Hadith/Salafi activism is religious and largely inner-Islamic, 
fighting for the “true” and correct Islam. The Ahl-i Hadith network is 
at best regional, but as part of the larger Salafi network global. Its 
transnational activism with regard to Pakistan is both in- and outbound. 
There is also a small but growing number of actors and institutions 
tracing themselves back to Turkish origins, such as the liberal Muslim 
Fethullah Gülen (b. 1938) schools now transforming into a global net-
work of their own (Tavernise 2008; Hakan and Esposito 2003).
Religious Nationalism and Migration
The reasons why transnational networks and institutions of, for instance, 
the Jama‘at-i Islami, the Barelwi missionary movement Da‘wat-i Islami, 
or the (Mirpuri) Kashmir groups show a preponderant influence of 
Pakistanis beyond the country’s borders lie in the flexible adaptation of 
its migrant and social networks. Those religious actors and institutions 
carry a distinctly Pakistani flavor and refer back to their roots in the 
country. They are rather treated as overseas branches of the Pakistani 
organization.
The network of Jama‘at-i Islami-affiliated groups and institutions 
now extends across the world, but has retained a clear Pakistani fla-
vor despite the fact that the “mother” organization still exists in India 
(WWWd). Its “independent” status is partly derived from the fact that, 
after partition, the JI founder Maududi continued to direct its affairs in 
Pakistan. It was in Pakistan that the JI could develop its major ambi-
tion of political Islamism evolving into a regular political party. This is 
in marked contrast with the TJ where the Indian center still remains the 
global headquarters, with the Pakistani headquarters in Raiwind being 
second among equals.
Contrary to other Islamic groups, the JI founder Maududi had always 
emphasized the need of conquering the state and polity to mould soci-
ety in the ways of fully observing and implementing the religious injunc-
tions of Islam. The JI developed a complete set of organizations (see 
Appendix I) for party politics, the affairs of students, women, academic 
research, ideological training and international liaising coordinated at 
its headquarters, al-Mansura, in Lahore. The JI self-consciously pres-
ents itself as an ideological party that pursues political Islamism on the 
lines of the Muslim Brotherhood. Its political orientation is very much 
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Pakistan-centric with a nationalist direction bordering on the chauvin-
istic, as can be seen by its strong stand on the Kashmir conflict and its 
ambition to become a governing party.
Despite being the smaller of the Islamic parties, the JI leader Qazi 
Husain strives to be seen as a political spokesman of all Islamic forces. 
Considering themselves a professional and modern force they seek to 
mediate between the conservative traditional Islamic sector tied to ac-
tivities of religious scholars and the modern sector of government and 
private sector institutions. JI cadres and their families expanded into a 
closely knit community and social network developing sectlike features. 
In Lahore, the JI runs its own housing society (like other Islamic groups).
The JI international network has grown out of this social cohesion 
and its nexus with diaspora communities. However, its international 
activity went beyond these social and cultural limitations following its 
ideological ambitions of political Islamism. The JI looks at international 
political issues from the position of international solidarity in much the 
same way as did the historical groupings of the Communist and the 
Socialist International. Yet despite its ideological affinity it continues to 
keep a separate profile and identity feeding on the distinct ethnic and 
cultural roots of its foreign members, which are not all but predomi-
nantly of South Asian descent.
The JI transnational activism is both out- and in-bound. This activ-
ism demonstrates the increasing impact of the JI on the international 
Islamist scene and their reverse influence on the JI. Such impact is em-
bodied in international students attending courses at its headquarters in 
Lahore. This activism also shows in the JI’s strong connections with the 
International Islamic Universities and the JI’s interest in international 
Islamic educational networking in general. It is further demonstrated 
in cooperation with like-minded political parties of Islam, such as the 
Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) in Malaysia. The JI runs foreign branches 
and student groups under different names developing into a globalizing 
JI network of transnational political Islam. Britain is the most promi-
nent example here. The JI’s UK branches play a key role through the 
UK Islamic Mission in London and the Islamic Foundation in Leicester 
(WWWe; WWWf). These branches have become centers in their own 
right not only for the JI’s influence in Europe, but they have also turned 
into a switchboard for reinforcing their impact in South Asia.
Despite its relatively close association with the JI ideology, the In-
ternational Islamic University Islamabad (IIUI) is a transnational actor 
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of Islam on its own. It teaches a whole range of secular courses (busi-
ness and management administration, law, social science, engineering, 
applied sciences) combined with Islamic studies courses and exten-
sive religious instruction (Cf. WWWg). Its pan-Islamic agenda is pro-
moted by the affiliated academies of Islamic Law (shari‘a) and Mission 
(da‘wa). On one level, it is part of a multinational network of religious 
modernism, linking up to International Universities in Malaysia, Su-
dan or South Africa. Here it pursues a transnational concept of Islamic 
education and propagation that expands on its own religio-ideological 
rationale. On another level, the Islamabad University is a very Paki-
stan-centered organization fully autonomous in its international activi-
ties which are both outbound (seminars, workshops, conferences) and 
inbound (international students). It is nowadays almost totally financed 
by Pakistan’s government acting more as a national educational institu-
tion than as an international agency. In the field of transnational Islam, 
the IIUI’s agenda is driven both by the state and by Jama‘at-i Islami 
thinking – a legacy of the Zia-ul-Haq era.
Barelwi organizations constitute another group of transnational ac-
tors that strongly reflect the influence of the nationalist culture and 
politics of Pakistan. While they pursue a larger religious agenda as 
discussed above, their attachment to Pakistan is very close. Almost all 
of their transnational activities are carried out by Pakistani diaspora 
representatives and their descendents. They also firmly look at leaders 
and headquarters in Pakistan with their concepts based in Pakistan’s 
social and cultural traditions.
Among the Barelwi organizations is the religious and educational 
movement Minhaj-ul-Quran (WWWgh, led by Tahir-ul-Qadri (b. 1951), 
and the Barelwi missionary movement of the Da‘wat-i Islami (Cf. Gu-
gler 2008; WWWi) that pursue a transnational ministry in distinctly 
Pakistani colors. Both were founded in 1980. Abroad, they provide cul-
tural and spiritual services to the Pakistani diaspora community which 
is also targeted for funds and adherents. The Minhaj-ul-Quran runs a 
network of private schools in Pakistan with its center in Lahore, teach-
ing secular degrees combined with religious instruction of the Barelwi 
variety. The Da‘wat-i Islami developed in competition with the Deo-
bandi-oriented Tablighi Jama‘at. It established itself as a global actor 
with its headquarters (Faizan-e Madina) in Karachi at the Old Vegetable 
Market (Purana Sabzi Mandi).
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Apart from Barelwi groups, Sufi scholars and networks emphasizing 
the spiritual message of tasawwuf (Islamic mysticism) operate out of 
Pakistan with growing intensity—although they do so also from India 
and other places of origin. The personal ministry of Maulana Hakim 
Muhammad Akhtar (b. 1928), who is based at his Sufi hospice in Ka-
rachi, the Khanqah Imdadiyya Ashrafiyya, presents an interesting case 
in point (Cf. WWWi). He is a disciple of the pietist Deobandi scholar 
and Sufi Shaykh Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanwi (1863-1943). His global 
followers reside in India, the UAE, South Africa, or the UK (WWWj; 
WWWk). As the current author learnt from an interview in 2005, Akhtar 
managed to gain the allegiance of the rector of the Deobandi school 
in South Africa, Darul Ulum Lenasia, thus weaning him away from the 
Tablighi Jama‘at. During that time Akhtar was mentioned as a new, up-
and-coming popular source of religious and spiritual guidance among 
migrant Deobandi activists.4
Maulana Abdul Hafiz Makki, a Deobandi shaykh, also runs a truly 
transnational ministry closely associated with Pakistan. As teacher of 
the Hadith, he is based at the Madrassa Saulatiyya in Mecca, Saudi 
Arabia. He has a strong base of disciples in Pakistan which he regu-
larly tours to receive donations and to give lectures. The local press 
also reported him to be a patron of sorts for militant outfits in Paki-
stan. And he is in regular attendance at public preaching events in the 
diaspora, especially in Britain and South Africa (Reetz 2007).
Transnational actors such as Kashmiri diaspora groups originat-
ing from Mirpur District in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir or the Muhajir 
Qaumi Mahaz operate out of Pakistan with a mixed agenda. Their po-
litical objectives are very much tied to Pakistani nationalism and out-
wardly secular. The Mirpuri activists support a nationalistic agenda on 
Kashmir with some wanting it to be part of Pakistan and others inde-
pendent. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF, 1966) with 
its various factions has been a major platform for this program. The 
MQM aims at achieving a secured position in the politics and economy 
of Pakistan for the community of Urdu-speaking migrants (Muhajirs) 
hailing from India. But their social fabric as transnational networks is 
marked by clear affinity with local culture and, by extension, spiritual 
Islam of the Barelwi variety, which has a strong influence in their for-
eign communities. Both use their transnational networks to mobilize 
funds and support.
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State Response
The response of the state to the efforts of Islamic actors from other 
countries to wield influence in Pakistan has been shaped by political 
exigencies and military compulsions as Pakistan formally joined the 
coalition of countries fighting a war on terror. Pakistan closed the doors 
to foreign students who attended madrassas in 2005 (WWWm). Clerics 
argued, however, that such an approach was discriminatory and vowed 
to continue taking in foreign students. In practice, foreign students 
now have to master a long vetting process of the receiving country, 
i.e. Pakistan, and the sending country. Those limitations apply less 
to modern Islamic schools offering secular education in addition to a 
religious curriculum, such as the International Islamic University. Here 
limitations are conditioned by financial constraints of the students and 
of Pakistan’s government. Nowadays scholarships for foreign students 
are rarely available. This resource crunch was mainly caused by the 
reduction in financial support from Middle Eastern donors who have 
lately been prevented from continuing their donations.
Pakistan’s military and security agencies also fight foreign radical 
Islamists with military means, with varying degree of success. They 
pursue mainly three targets: foreign fighters operating clandestinely 
in Pakistan’s large urban conglomerations; groups of foreign Islamist 
fighters stranded after the Afghan war, such as the Uzbeks, Chechens 
and the Chinese Muslims from Xinjiang; and those attached to the com-
mand structures of al Qaeda, allegedly hiding in the mountainous tribal 
areas of the Pak-Afghan borderland. It is, however, assumed that the 
state’s reluctance to pursue the sectarian and jihadi groups operating 
in Kashmir leaves many loopholes for Islamic militants to regroup. In 
addition, the defeated Afghan Taliban established command structures 
in Pakistan, with their leaders more or less openly residing in Quetta, 
Baluchistan. Parts of Pakistan’s military and security establishment still 
pursue a Central Asian hinterland option where they are ready to toler-
ate or utilize local militants to counter perceived Indian influence in Af-
ghanistan and to prepare for a post-intervention scenario after the U.S 
would withdraw from there (Reetz 1993, 1994).
Pakistan has been reluctant to deal with these militants who, among 
other factors, contributed to the formation and emergence of a “local” 
Pakistani Taliban force under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud (Cf. 
Hasan 2007). Those groups, however, remain highly heterogeneous and 
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are strongly marked by local tribal custom. It has often been argued 
that hard-hitting military measures on behalf of the Pakistani state and 
the U.S. allied forces accompanied by many civilian casualties have the 
tendency to prolong the conflict and strengthen the opponents as those 
tribal militias articulate not only Islamist political objectives, but also 
tribal concerns about marginalization and underdevelopment. The new 
Pakistan coalition government has vowed to find a political solution, an 
approach which has come in for heavy criticism by the Americans in 
turn.
Evaluating Islamic Transnationalism in Pakistan
Given the complexity of the issue with regard to Pakistan, it seems 
difficult and perhaps not even useful to identify singular conduits or 
means of influence for transnational Islamic actors in the country.
While recognizing the mutual and overlapping influences of factors, 
this paper would, in conclusion, argue for a decided differentiation 
between political, religious and socio-ethnic actors, institutions and 
motives in transnational Islam with regard to Pakistan. The proposed 
classification allows identifying the root causes of militancy in the 
transnational Islam of Pakistan. As a result, it is suggested to de-
dramatize the actors and institutions under categories two and three 
relating to religious activism and Pakistan nationalism. Those actors 
and institutions have to be evaluated in the context of globalization, 
understood as a complex and historical process, going beyond economic 
and financial aspects. Instead, the paper would invite to firmly deal 
with the first category of political and ideological motivations – not on 
religious or Islamic, but on political grounds.
Against this background, it is rather the reluctance or inability of 
the Pakistani government to introduce firm standards of law and civil-
ity which has allowed transnational Islamic actors to create a political 
and security threat to its own citizens and to other countries, both 
in the region and beyond. It is strongly advised against conceiving 
concepts to manage or change aspects of the religious beliefs and 
practice of transnational Islamic actors as such interventions will in-
evitably backfire. While some political analysts believe that the ma-
drassa system is one major source of instability, it is cautioned here 
that religious education will always have to remain religious in nature. 
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Educational standards can only be improved by lifting public educa-
tion in a major way. All social and political actors – religious or not 
– have to agree on the norms of civil cohabitation – and have to be 
bound by them.
The classification of transnational Islam proposed in this paper 
further helps in understanding that much of the transnational Islam 
emanating from Pakistan is driven by the desire to fulfill spiritual, 
social and cultural needs of Pakistan’s extensive migrant communi-
ties around the world. Since many of them live in conditions of utter 
marginalization, these networks are meeting the needs of people who 
are at the receiving end of globalization. To improve their lot, better 
social and political concepts are required to integrate them instead 
of marginalizing and castigating their transnational religious support 
networks.
The diversity and heterogeneity of Pakistan’s transnational Islamic 
actors and institutions also suggests questioning the analytical value 
of the category of transnational Islam. One has to ask if such a cat-
egory is not more reflective of political impulses aiming to control 
Muslims and their organizations rather than the desire for a nuanced 
analysis. In any case, it is the political, social and cultural issues be-
hind transnational Islam which need attention and solving.
Judged in terms of political virulence, it is the unstable, charged 
and polarized nature of the overall political framework in Pakistan that 
pushes many transnational actors of Islam into the political, extremist 
and even militant realm. Currently, the major threat to the stability of 
Pakistan comes from sectarian and jihadi groups that spin out of con-
trol from state and religious patronage. Pakistan cannot successfully 
fight the newly emergent Pakistani Taliban in the country’s northwest 
regions as long as some elements in the administration hope to keep 
intact parts of the militant network for operation against India and the 
Karzai government. But Pakistan can neither achieve success as long 
as it does not address the tribal dimension of this warfare successfully 
since much of current Taliban operations reflect long-standing disaf-
fected and marginalized tribal concerns. 
To prevent transnational actors of Islam in Pakistan from harming 
each other and civil society, the Pakistani state needs to resurrect its 
civil authority and regulate these institutions without discriminating 
against them. It will further have to focus on social rehabilitation and 
the development of disaffected communities giving rise to militant Is-
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lam which is on the verge of turning into local insurgencies, with edu-
cation, employment and social amenities holding prime importance. 
On many of these issues the civil and security-related bureaucracy of 
Pakistan is currently on the retreat, a course which urgently needs to 
be reversed.
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1  Nearly all madrassa and mosque networks fit this understand-
ing as local worship and the local transmission of religious knowledge 
and practice dominate their activities.
2 A good example for this understanding is the missionary move-
ment of the Tablighi Jama‘at (TJ): its main objective, the reconversion 
of Muslims, does not per se require the expansion of activities to other 
countries, but can be equally achieved by local efforts. It is rather the 
sociological group dynamics of leadership, control and competition in 
the Islamic field that drive the TJ around the globe. The same approach 
is shared by other non-Islamic religious groups from South Asia of Hin-
du, Sikh, Parsi and Buddhist denomination. This would also belie the 
assumption that it is monotheistic aspirations of universalist sal vation 
that are reflected in such patterns of behavior. The religious traditions 
just mentioned are polytheistic and often local in the nature of their wor-
ship and practice. Also, non-religious actors have adopted the same pat-
tern, as can be seen from the tendency of Pakistan’s political parties 
to establish foreign branches. During the current author’s recent field 
research in Barcelona, Spain, it was learnt that the Pakistani community 
there also comprises a unit of the Nawaz Sharif Muslim League. The crea-
tion of Pakistan community associations there including even a radio sta-
tion would make the same point.
3  “For training this Army of Islam, Musharraf and Aziz, assisted by 
Maj. Gen. (retd) Mahmud Durrani, selected 100 of the then existing 
madrassas, almost all Deobandi, and introduced military training by serv-
ing and retired officers of the Pakistan Army attached to them.” 
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4  The author’s interview during field research in 2005.
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